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THE CANONS OF INDIAN TREATY AND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: A
PROPOSAL FOR CODIFICATION
The United States expanded in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries principally by acquiring lands from North American Indians.
In exchange for such lands, federal-Indian treaties often promised United
States' protection of Indian autonomy and rights. These treaties
established a trust relationship between the United States and Indians. 1
The judiciary, recognizing both the trust relationship and bargaining
inequities between Indian tribes and the federal government, developed
canons of construction consfruing treaty ambiguities in favor of Indians. 2
Courts later extended the canons of construction to apply to federal
statutes affecting Indians. 3
Supreme Court decisions in recent years, however, represent a retreat
from the use of the canons in construing ambiguous treaties or statutes. 4
The Court has declined to apply the canons when interpreting unclear
treaty and statutory language and has interpreted ambiguities in favor
of the parties opposing the claimed Indian interest. 5
Inconsistent use of the canons of construction in interpreting Indian
treaties and statutes jeopardizes Indian rights, Indian interests, and
the federal-Indian trust. Vacillating application also frustrates federal
policies promoting Indian self-government and economic development. 6
I. See F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 220-28 (1982 ed.); Chambers, Judicial
Enforcement of the Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1213 (1975); see
also Treaty at Hopewell, Nov. 28, 1785, 7 Stat. 18 ("the Commissioners . . . of the United
States ... receive [the Cherokees] into the favour and protection of the United States of America
... "), quoted in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 550 (1832). See also infra notes
9-37 and accompanying text.
2. E.g., Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. I (1956); Winters v. United States,
207 U.S. 564 (1908); Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. I (1899).
3. See Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194 (1975); see also infra notes 65-73 and accompanying text.
4. During the 1970s, the Supreme Court heard 33 Indian law cases. LEG'4 SERVICES CORPORATION, FUNDAMENTALS OF AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: THE HISTORY OF FEDERAL-INDIAN POLICY
14 (1981). The Court decided over 20 cases favorably to Indians in the first part of that decade.
Israel, The Reemergence of Tribal Nationalism and Its Impact on Reservation Resource Development, 47 Cow. L. REV. 617, 630 (1976). In the latter half of the 1970s, however, Court decisions
demonstrate "something of a 'backlash'" against Indian interests. LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, supra, at 14.
5. See, e.g., Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978); Barsh & Henderson,
Contrary Jurisprudence: Tribal Interests in Navigable Waterways Before and After Montana
v. United States, 56 WASH. L. REV. 627,675 (1981); Clinton, State Power Over Indian Reservations: A Critical Comment on Burger Court Doctrine, 26 S.D.L. REv. 434, 444 n.37 (1981).
6. For example, Congress passed the Indian Financing Act of 1974, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1543
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This Note argues that the canons of construction should play a central role in the interpretation of Indian treaties and statutes. The Note
proposes revitalization of the canons through congressional action codifying the rules of construction into federal law. Part I traces the
historical development of the canons to further the federal-Indian trust
relationship. Part II analyzes recent Supreme Court decisions that
demonstrate decreased use of the canons. Part III argues that strong
canons of construction are necessary to the development of selfdetermining Indian tribes and proposes federal legislation to ensure
the continued vitality and importance of the canons of construction.
I.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE CANONS OF INDIAN TREATY AND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

The canons of Indian treaty and statutory construction evolved
judicially as a component of the federal fiduciary duty to protect Indian culture and resource rights. Citing language barriers and disparate
bargaining positions,' the courts created unique construction principles
that ensured the fulfillment of federal promises while preserving the
substance of agreements made under coercive conditions. 8

A.

The Federal-Indian Trust Relationship

After the American Revolution, the federal government of the United
States succeeded to an established system within which tribes had a
recognized sovereign status 9 and legally protected Indian title of occupancy was usually extinguished by agreement and purchase rather
than war. 10 The first treaties between the United States and Indian na(1982), to aid the development of physical and human Indian resources. Strict judicial construction of ambiguous treaties or statutes can impair valuable Indian property interests. See Mitchell
v. United States, 445 U.S. 535 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Mitchell I].
7. See, e.g., Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. I, II (1899).
8. See G. FOREMAN, INDIAN REMOVAL 198, 236 (1953).
9. The United States adhered to the European discovery doctrine allocating fee title to new
world land to the discovering nation. The federal government inherited this fee title subject to
a title of occupancy in the Indian nations actually possessing the land. Indian title of occupancy
was extinguishable by agreement, conquest, or purchase. See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8
Wheat.) 543 (1823); l E. DEVATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 99-100 (J. Chitty ed. 1893); D. JONES,
LICENSE FOR EMPIRE (1982); M. PRICE & R. CLINTON, LAW AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN 53)-41
(2d ed. 1983); Cohen, The Spanish Origin of Indian Rights in the Law of the United States,
31 GEO. L.J. I (1942).
10. The first Secretary of War, Henry Knox, advised President Washington to support a
law recognizing Indian title and prohibiting the transfer of land possessed by Indians without
payment and federal approval. This led to the enactment of the Trade and Intercourse Act of
1790, ch. 33, Sec. 4, I Stat. 137 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1982)). W. WASHBURN,
RED MAN'S LAND/WmTE MAN'S LAW 55 (1971).
Cultural differences regarding the concept of land "ownership" complicated Indian-non-Indian
relations. AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMM'N, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., TASK FORCE Two,
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tions resembled the European-Indian agreements concluded between
sovereign nations. 11
By the early nineteenth century, however, federal-Indian treaties began
to reflect the growing power of the United States, and the concomitant waning position of Indian tribes. 12 Increasing dominance of the
federal government over Indian tribes led to the development of a set
of moral and legal principles designed to promote fair dealings and
preserve Indian sovereignty. 13 These principles stemmed from the
Supreme Court's characterization of the polit~cal tie between the United
REPORT ON TRIBAL GOVERNMENT 77-78 (1976) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE Two]; see Johnson
v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 589-90 (1823); V. DELORIA, JR., Goo 1s RED (1973); D.
JONES, supra note 9, at 84; Eisinger, The Puritans' Justification for Taking the Land, 84 EssEx
INST. HIST. COLLECTION 131 (1948).
Differences regarding the concept and value of land remain a problem today, particularly when
a tribe claims compensation for lands taken by the federal government. See Clinton, Isolated

in Their Own Country: A Defense of Federal Protection of Indian Autonomy and Self-Government,
33 STAN. L. REV. 979, 1040-44 (1981); see also V. DELORIA, JR., supra at 7-9.
11. The first treaty between the United States and an Indian nation denied any designs on
the Delaware Tribe's territory, and recognized "all their teritoreal [sic] rights in the fullest and
most ample manner . . . . " Treaty with the Delawares, Sept. 17, 1778, a.rt. 6, 7 Stat. 13. The
Supreme Court described this treaty as formed on the model of treaties between European nations. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 550-52, 560 (1832); see F. COHEN, supra note
I, at 111; see also, Treaty with the Sachems and Warriors of the Six Nations, Oct. 22, 1784,
7 Stat. 15; Treaty with the Wiandots, Delawares, Chippewas, and Ottowas, Jan. 21, 1785, 7
Stat. 16. See generally 2 INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES: INDIANS OF NORTH AMERICATREATIES (C. Kappler ed. 1904) (compiling all federal-Indian treaties); INSTITUTE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDIAN LAW, INC., A CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS MADE BY
INDIAN TRIBES WITH THE UNITED STATES (1973).
12. See AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW CoMM'N, 95TH CONG., 1ST SESS., FINAL REPORT
47 (1977) [hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT].
For an understanding of the history of federal Indian law, see A. DEBO, A HISTORY oF THE
INDIANS OF THE UNITED STATES (1970); V. DELORIA, JR., & C. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS,
AMERICAN JUSTICE (1983); F. PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE FORMATrvE YEARS (1962);
w. WASHBURN, THE INDIAN IN AMERICA (1975). See generally R. BARSH & J. HENDERSON, THE
ROAD (1980); F. COHEN, supra note I, at 47-201; M. PRICE & R. CLINTON, supra note 9 at
68-91; W. WASHBURN, supra note 10; V. DELORIA, JR., supra note 10; D. JONES, supra note
9; K. KICKINGBIRD & K. DUCHENEAUX, ONE HUNDRED MILLION ACRES (1973); Strickland, The

Absurd Ballet of American Indian Policy or American Indian Struggling With Ape on Tropical
Landscape: An Afterword, 31 MAINE L. REV. 213-21 (1979).
As the United States expanded, pressures increased to assimilate Indians into the dominant
non-Indian society. The first federal policy period emphasizing such goals began with the passage
of the Indian General Allotment Act or Dawes Act in 1887, 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-358 (1982). The
Act, designed to discourage Indian hunting cultures, divided reservations into 160 acre farming
plots which were allotted to individual Indians. The Indian became fee owner after a 25-year
period of inalienability. Assimilated Indians also became United States citizens. Reservation land
in excess of the allotted plots, deemed "surplus," was opened to non-Indian settlement. M. PRICE& R. CLINTON, supra note 9, at 77-81. The Dawes Act remained in effect for over forty years
before Congress recognized its failure. A total of 40,848,172 acres of land allotted to individual
Indians was removed from tribal ownership. Approximately 49,000,000 additional "surplus"
acres were sold to non-Indians. K. KICKINGBIRD & K. DUCHENEAUX, supra, at 23-24.
13. Indian law principles are grounded in the concept of an Indian tribe as a sovereign political
body, able to make and enforce its own laws within its boundaries. FINAL REPORT, supra note
12, at 4; see Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
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States and Indian tribes as a fiduciary relationship. 14 The trust theory
developed by the Supreme Court imposed an obligation on all three
branches of the federal government to insulate Indian tribes from nonIndian, state, and foreign encroachment. 15 The Court did not, however,
elaborate the duties of the federal trustee. 16 Two distinct views of the
14. Federal Indian law is often described as "sui generis" because of the unique federalIndian trust relationship, the obligations arising from the trust, :\nd the extraordinary power
of Congress over Indians. See F. COHEN, supra note I, at I; Wilkinson & Volkman, Judicial
Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation: "As Long as the Water Flows or Grass Grows Upon the
Earth"-How Long a Time Is That?, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 601,612 (1975). See infra notes 17-37
and accompanying text. The origin of the federal-Indian trust relationship is usually attributed
to two early Marshall Court decisions. See generally Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study In
Law, Politics, and Morality, 21 STAN. L. REV. 500 (1969). Both cases involved Georgia's claim
of legislative jurisdiction over Cherokee lands within the state's boundaries, and the Supreme
Court's power to determine the issues.
In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) I (1831), the Court held it did not have
jurisdiction to hear an original action brought by the Cherokee Nation to restrain Georgia from
imposing state laws on the tribe in violation of treaties made with the. United States. The Court
found that the tribe was neither a state nor a foreign nation, and thus was without standing.
Id. at 15-19. In the Court's view, the Indian tribes were "[d]omestic dependent nations," id.
at 16, whose relationship to the United States resembled "[t]hat of a ward to his guardian."
Id. This view established the federal-Indian trust relationship. See also id. at I, 20-49, 53 (concurring and dissenting opinions offering differing views of the federal-Indian relationship). In
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) the Court found Georgia statutes exerting
control over Cherokee territory preempted by federal treaties and statutes. To determine the
extent of retained Cherokee sovereignty, the Supreme Court interpreted relevant treaty clauses
professing dependence on the United States as creating treaties of protection. Id. at 552, 560.
The Court also analyzed the federal Trade and Intercourse Acts, 25 U .S.C. § 177 (I 982), to
· find congressional recognition of Indian nations as separate sovereign political communities, "(h]aving a right to all the lands within those boundaries, which is not only acknowledged, but guarantied [sic] by the United States." 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 556 (1832) (emphasis added). The Court's
treatment of federal-Indian ties and analysis of the Cherokee treaties as contracts of mutual
obligation confirmed the federal-Indian trust relationship.
Another possible source of the federal-Indian trust lies in the Trade and Intercourse Act of
1790, ch. 33, § 4, I Stat. 137 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. 177 (1982)). See AMERICAN
INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMM'N TASK FORCE NINE, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW CONSOLIDATION, REVISION, AND CODIFICATION 22 (1976) [hereinafter cited as TASK
FORCE NINE].
The trust relationship may also have a constitutional foundation in the Indian Commerce Clause,
which authorizes Congress to "regulate commerce ... with the Indian Tribes," U.S. CoNsT.
art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and the Treaty Clause, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. See Morton v. Mancari,
417 U.S. 535, 551-52, (1974); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172
n.7 (1973).
Yet another constitutional source of the trust relationship may be found in the Property Clause.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. See F. COHEN, supra note I, at 207-12.
15. See Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977); Seminole Nation
v. United States, 316 U.S. 286 (1942); Lane v. Pueblo of Santa Rosa, 249 U.S. 110 (1919);
Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1973), rev'd on
other grounds, 499 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962 (1975); Clinton, supra
note 10, at 1001.
16. See Chambers, supra note I. The uncertain scope of the federal trust responsibility has
often led the Supreme Court to ground trust duties on specific statutes rather than general fiduciary
principles. Compare United States v. Mitchell, 103 S. Ct. 2961 (1983) (recognizing a cause of
action against the United States based on breach of a fiduciary duty arising from forestry manage-

SPRING

1984)

Indian Canons

685

trust subsequently emerged, one promoted by the courts and another
supported by Indian law scholars and Indian leaders.
1. The Ward-Guardian Relationship- Most courts have limited the
federal-Indian fiduciary relationship to some version of the "wardguardian" trust. 17 Under the "ward-guardian" or "passive" trust model,
the federal fiduciary duty is limited to specific provisions of treaties
or statutes; no legally enforceable trust covers all aspects of federalIndian interaction. 18 For example, a tribe cannot sue the federal government for mismanagement of reservation resources unless a statute or
treaty specifically demonstrates a federal duty to manage tribal assets. 19
Because Congress can also vary the trust as it applies to all tribes,
or change the trust relationship with a particular tribe by statute, 20
tribes have little influence over the nature of their relationship to the
federal government under the passive trust model. 21
A corollary version of the passive trust defines the federal obligation in moral terms. This model requires only that the federal government act in good faith when dealing with Indians. 22
2. The Trustee-Beneficiary Relationship- The ''trustee-beneficiary''
or "active" trust model of the federal-Indian relationship has been
ment statutes) [hereinafter cited as Mitchell II] with Mitchell I, 445 U.S. 535 (1980) (denying
the same tribe a cause of action for the same injury based on the Dawes Act which created
no general fiduciary duty).
Congress has expressed its understanding of federal obligations under the trust. Article II I
of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 provided:
The utmost good faith shall always be observed toward the Indians; their land and
property shall never be taken from them without their consent; and in their property,
rights and liberty, they shall never be invaded or disturbed, unless in justified and
lawful wars authorized by Congress; but laws founded in justice and humanity shall
from time to time be made, for preventing wrongs being done to them, and for preserving peace and friendship with them.
Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, I Stat. 50 (Ordinance of 1787 recodified by the First Congress).
11. See, e.g., Nevada v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2906, 2916-17 (1983) (rejecting application
of equitable fiduciary principles to impose duty on Secretary of Interior to favor Indian interests
over a conflicting government project); see also Chambers, supra note 1, at 1227.
18. A common law guardianship denies the ward any right to control its property. 39 C.J.S.
Guardian & Ward§ 72 (1976). See FiNAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 126-27; AMERICAN INDIAN
POLICY REVIEW COMM'N TASK FORCE THREE, 94TH CONG., 2o SESS., REPORT ON FEDERAL AoMINISTRATION AND STRUCTURE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS 27-28 (1976) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE
THREE].
19. See Mitchell II, 103 S. Ct. 2961 (1983); Mitchell I, 445 U.S. 535 (1980); see also Chambers,
supra note I, at 1220-21. See generally Sierra Club v. Andrus, 487 F. Supp. 443, 449 (D.D.C.
1980), aff'd sub nom. Sierra Club v. Watt, 659 F.2d 203 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
20. See, e.g., Act of June 17, 1954, ch. 303, 68 Stat. 250 (terminating the Menominee tribe
from the trust, ending its eligibility for federal benefits, and excluding it from protection under
federal Indian laws).
21. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 126-27.
22. See Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-97 (1942) ("Under a humane
and self-imposed policy ... [Congress] has charged itself with moral obligations ... "); Lone
Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 568 (1903) (presuming Congress acted in good faith in ratifying a federal-Indian agreement).
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advocated by scholars, 23 senators, 24 and Indians 25 but has not been accepted by the courts. 26 In the active trust paradigm, the Indian tribes
would be recognized as inherently sovereign entities that have exchanged
land and certain attributes of sovereignty in return for federal protection of internal autonomy on recognized Indian lands, and federal
economic aid. 27 The federal government would have a legally enforceable
duty to provide services, protect Indian sovereign rights, and aid Indian development. 28
The active trust relationship complements current federal policies that
seek to further Indian self-sufficiency. 29 This trust model would be flexible enough to encompass changing Indian needs. 3 ° Further, Indians
would play a significant role in tribal resource development decisions. 31
Neither the federal government nor the courts have treated the alternative trust paradigms equally. The trust relationship has in practice
23. See, e.g., Barsh & Henderson, supra note 5, at 685; Clinton, supra note IO; FINAL REPORT,
supra note 12; Israel, supra note 4; AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMM'N, 94TH CONG.,
2D SESS., TASK FORCE ONE, REPORT ON TRUST RESPONSIBILITIES AND THE FEDERAL-INDIAN RELATIONSHIP; INCLUDING TREATY REVIEW 179-80 (1976) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE ONE].
See also Chambers, supra note I; MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF TiiE UNITED STATES, TRANSMITTING RECOMMENDATIONS FoR INDIAN POLICY, H.R. Doc. No. 363, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970)
[hereinafter cited as MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT].
24. See Federal Protection of Indian Resources: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Ad. Prac.
and Proc. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) [hereinafter cited
as Kennedy Hearings]; S. REP. No. 92-561, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
25. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 127. See generally Kennedy Hearings, supra note
24; TASK FORCE ONE, supra note 23.
26. See, e.g., Nevada v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2906 (1983); Menominee Tribe of Indians
v. United States, 607 F.2d 1335 (Ct. Cl. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 950 (1980). But see Pyramid
Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1973) (requiring Secretary
of Interior, on basis of fiduciary duties, to formulate a regulation preserving water for the litigating
tribe), rev'd on other grounds, 499 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962
(1975). Courts have accepted the active trust paradigm in other areas. The natural resources public
trust doctrine, for example, requires land held in trust by state governments for the public to
be used for beneficial public purposes. Legislative action to restrict public uses, or to remove
public land from the trust are viewed with "considerable skepticism" by the courts. See Sax,
The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH.
L. REV. 473, 490 (1970).
27. The Court in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), envisioned this model
of the trust. See generally F. COHEN, supra note I, at 180-206; Chambers, supra note I at 1221;
Clinton, supra note 10; TASK FORCE ONE, supra note 23, at 180.
28. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 136; TASK FORCE NINE, supra note 14, at 28-30;
see generally the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. § 450a(a)
(1982); Kennedy Hearings, supra note 24.
29. See infra notes 161-63 and accompanying text; see generally S. REP. No. 561, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1971).
30. The public trust has proven to be a common law and statutory doctrine flexible enough
to meet contemporary demands. See Sax, supra note 26. See generally National Audubon Sec'y
v. Superior Ct., 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346 (1983); Wilkinson & Volkman,
supra note 14, at 650-59.
31. See Israel, supra note 4; FINAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 127; see also Clinton, supra
note IO, 1044-50.

SPRING

1984]

Indian Canons

687

frequently served as a justification for expanding federal control over
internal Indian affairs. Judicial decisions, for example, have employed
the ward-guardian model3 2 to give Congress great discretion in regulating
all aspects of Indian life. 33 Further, "plenary" 34 congressional control
over Indians allows Congress to abrogate treaties unilaterally, 35 to "limit,
modify, or eliminate the powers of local self-government which the
tribes otherwise possess, " 36 and to eliminate the trust relationship itself. 37

B.

The Canons of Indian Treaty and Statutory Construction:
Unique Principles of Interpretation

Uncertainty over the scope of the federal-Indian trust relationship
resulted in conflicts between the fiduciary duty to Indians and national
land acquisition and development goals. 38 Treaties and agreements
transferred millions of acres 39 of Indian lands to the United States
without adequate translators to overcome language and cultural
barriers 40 and without government acknowledgement of instances of
questionable federal dealings. 41 Although the courts did not use the
32. See, e.g., United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187
U.S. 553 (1903); see generally United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 331 (1978).
33. The Supreme Court has, for example, upheld congressional extension of criminal jurisdiction
over Indians on the basis of the trust relationship, after finding that the statute exceeded legislative
powers authorized by the Indian Commerce Clause of the Constitution. United States v. Kagama,
I 18 U.S. 375 (1886). Nonetheless, the trust relationship has not served as an independent source
of congressional power since 1926. United States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432 (1926). LEGAL
SERVICES CORPORATION, FUNDAMENTALS OF AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: THE FEDERAL-INDIAN TRUST
RELATIONSHIP 8 (1981); see also United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634 (1978); See generally Laurance,
The Indian Commerce Clause, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 203 (1981).
34. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903); see also Warren Trading Post Co.
v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965). At one time, the Court intimated that congressional control over Indian affairs constituted a political question, precluding judicial review.
See Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294, 308 (1902). This position has been repudiated.
See Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 83-85 (1977); Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 215-17 (1962).
35. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903); Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264, 271
(1898); Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 14, at 604.
36. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978); see also United States v. Antelope,
430 U.S. 641 (1977); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
37. See United States v. Seminole Nation, 299 U.S. 417, 428-29 (1937); 25 U.S.C. § 564
(1982). See generally F. COHEN, supra note I, at 215.
38. See Nevada v. United States, 103 S Ct. 2906 (1983); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S.
553 (1903). "It is impossible to avoid the conclusion . . . that the young nation's ideals were
often subservient to its ambitions . . . . " Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 14, at 61 I.
39. The United States covers approximately 2.2 billion acres. TASK FORCE ONE, supra note
23, at 37. In 1887, natives held almost 2 billion acres; in 1924, 150 million acres, and in 1975,
50 million acres. FINAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 305.
40. Treaty negotiations between tribes of the Pacific Northwest and the United States, for
example, were conducted in Chinook, a commercial jargon consisting of 300 words. In comparison, the average child has nearly a 300 word vocabulary by the age of two. Comment, Indian
Treaty Analysis and Off-Reservation Fishing Rights: A Case Study, 51 WASH. L. REV. 61, 62
n.11 (1975).
41. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 109.
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trust relationship to void such agreements in their entirety42 , the judiciary
did establish principles to lessen the effects of the unequal bargaining
positions. 43
Implicitly acknowledging that federal territorial expansion was
irreversible, 44 the Supreme Court developed unique treaty construction
canons that regulate specific federal-Indian transactions. These canons
of construction embody the federal equitable fiduciary duties 45 imposed
on the United States through the federal-Indian trust. 46 The canons
of construction are more than discretionary rules of interpretation. 47
These principles are substantive components of the trust relationship,
limiting ple1;1ary congressional power over Indians. 48
The canons of construction divide into two general categories: those
which apply to bilateral federal acts concluded between Indians and
the United States, 49 and those which apply to unilateral federal acts
affecting Indians. so Although the canons of construc~ion evolved to
protect Indian rights in the context of coercive treaty negotiations, trust
responsibilities require the United States to safeguard Indian interests
in all dealings with Indians. The Supreme Court therefore extended
the canons to ensure that Congress and the executive would uphold
their fiduciary responsibilities when unilaterally affecting Indian rights. 5 1

42. See Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 297 (1942).
43. In Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), the Court formulated the first
canon of Indian treaty construction in conjunction with its discussions of the protection obligation to Indians. 31 U.S. I, at 552, 581. See F. COHEN, supra note I, at 221; Chambers, supra
note I, at 1214-15.
44. See Johnson v. M'lntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 589, 591-92 (1823).
45. See United States v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391, 398 (1973); St. Paul lntertribal Hous. Bd.
v. Reynolds, 564 F. Supp. 1408, 1411 (D. Minn. 1983); Eric v. Secretary of Hous. & Urban
Dev., 464 F. Supp. 44, 46 (D. Alaska 1978).
46. See, e.g., Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County, 532 F.2d 655, 660 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977); F. COHEN, supra note I, at 221-25; M. PRICE & R.
CLINTON, supra note 9, at 137; see also Barsh & Henderson, supra note 5, at 654.
47. General interpretation principles are often contradictory, and are applied at the court's
discretion. See Llewellyn, Remarks On the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons
About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395 (1950).
48. See Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County, 532 F.2d 665, 660 (10th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 492 U.S. 1038 (1977); V. DELORIA, JR. & C. LYTLE, supra note 12, at 46-50, 57.
49. These include federal-Indian treaties, and congressionally-ratified federal Indian agreements.
See F. COHEN, supra note I, at 223-24.
50. Unilateral acts encompass both federal statutes and executive orders. Numerous statutes
regulate Indians, and reservations were created by executive order until 19 I 9. See 43 U .S .C.
§ 150 (1982). See Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976); Antoine v. Washington, 420
U.S. 195 (1975); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 598-601 (1963); see generally 25 U.S.C.
(1982) (regulation of Indians); F. COHEN, supra note I, at 127-28, 224,493; IC. KAPPLER, supra
note 11 (compiling executive orders creating reservations).
51. See, e.g., Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 392-93 (1976); Antoine v. Washington,
420 U.S. I 94, I 99-200 (I 975); FINAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 11 I; Barsh & Henderson, supra
note 5, at 653 (noting that the canons provided perhaps "the only check on Congress that Indians could invoke").

SPRING

1984]

Indian Canons

689

1. The Reserved Rights Doctrine- The reserved rights doctrine
posits that Indian treaties "[are] not a grant of rights to the Indians,
but a grant of rights from them - a reservation of those not granted. " 52
A basic principle of federal Indian law, 53 the reserved rights of ''inherent powers" 5 • doctrine ensures that tribes, as inherent sovereigns,
retain all rights not expressly granted. 55 The doctrine complements the
canons of construction as a guide to the interpretation of ambiguities
that could result in the loss of sovereign tribal rights. 56
2. The basic canons of Indian treaty construction- The original
canon of construction derives from an 1832 Supreme Court case 57 that
focused on the Indian tribe's understanding of ambiguous treaty
provisions. 58 Finding that the Indians did not understand the treaties
to surrender internal tribal sovereignty, the Court construed the ambiguous provisions to favor that understanding. 59
The Supreme Court did not expressly formulate a succinct principle
of construction. Rather, it determined probable Indian understanding
and interpreted ambiguities from Indian perspectives. The Court subsequently refined the original construction method into a requirement
that treaties be construed as the participating Indians understood them. 60
52. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905).
53. See F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 122 (1945 ed.).
54. TASK FORCE NINE, supra note 14, at 41.
55. The doctrine has, for example, protected Indian intentions to reserve fishing rights, see
United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905), and ensured adequate water supplies for reservation lands. See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 598-601 (1963); Winters v. United States,
207 U.S. 564 (1908). The reserved rights doctrine also protects internal tribal sovereignty. See
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980); V. DELORIA,
JR. & C. LYTLE, supra note 12, at 48-50; FINAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 110.
56. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. I 91 (1978). See generally TASK FORCE
NINE, supra note 14 at 28, 41 (Proposed Congressional Findings and Declaration of Policy §
3, recognizing inherent sove(eign status of tribes limited only by treaty or federal statute).
57. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
58. The Court was interpreting the Treaty at Hopewell, Nov. 28, 1785, 7 Stat. 18, and the
Treaty at Holston, July 2, 1791, 7 Stat. 39 . See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 5 I 5,
556-57 (1832). In reading the treaty provisions, the Court stated:
Is it reasonable to suppose that the Indians, who could not write, and most probably could not read, who certainly were not critical judges of our language should
distinguish the word "allotted" from the words "marked out." . . . . [l]t may very
well be supposed that they might not understand the term employed, as indicating
that, instead of granting, they were receiving lands. If the term would admit of no
other signification, which is not conceded, its being misunderstood is so apparent,
results so necessarily from the whole transaction; that it must, we think be taken in
the sense in which it was most obviously used.
Id. at 552-53. See also id. at 581.
59. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 546, 550-52 (1832).
60. See Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. l, 11 (1899). The Court stated that "the treaty must
therefore be construed, not according to the technical meaning of its words to learned lawyers,
but in the sense in which they [sic] would naturally be understood by the Indians." Id. This
canon was patterned after the concurring opinion in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.)
5 I 5, 581 (1832) (McLean, J., concurring).
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A related canon requires ambiguous expressions in treaties to be resolved
in favor of the Indians, 61 and a final canon mandates that treaties be
construed liberally to favor Indians. 62
Congress ended treaty-making between the United States and Indian
nations in 1871. 63 The Supreme Court extended the canons of construction to apply to the congressionally ratified federal-Indian "agreements"
that replaced formal treaties. 64 The Court thus ensured that the principles embodied in the canons would not be avoided by changing the
form of federal-Indian land transfers.

3.

The canons of construction applicable to unilateral federal acts-

The origin and breadth of the canons of statutory construction are
less clear than those of the basic treaty canons. The first case to apply
the canons to a unilateral congressional act 65 did so on the basis of
a prior Supreme Court case 66 that actually involved a bilateral agreement incorporated into federal legislation.
Not all the basic canons of construction apply to unilateral federal
acts. Congressional legislation and executive orders are not construed
as Indians would understand them, for Indian understanding did not
influence the formulation of the federal acts. The government's trust
obligations, however, mandate the resolution of ambiguities to favor
Indians. Legislation favoring Indian interests is thus construed broadly,
while legislation impairing Indian interests is construed narrowly. 67
The extent to which the canons of construction apply to unilateral
federal acts either expressly or implicitly affecting Indians is not well
defined. Some commentators argue that the canons of construction
apply to statutes whenever they conflict with a treaty. 68 Others, however,

61. See, e.g., McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973); Winters
v·. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1908).
62. See, e.g., Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194,200 (1975); Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S.
665, 675 (1912).
63. 25 u.s.c. § 71 (1982).
64. Agreements were ratified by both the Senate and the House of Representatives. See Choate
v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665 (1912); In re Heff, 197 U.S. 488, 499 (1905); Act of Mar. 1, 1901,
ch. 675, 31 Stat. 848; M. PRICE & R. CLINTON, supra note 9, at 78.
65. Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78 (1918).
66. Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665 (1912). See generally Decker, The Construction of Indian
Treaties, Agreements, and Statutes, 5 AM. IND. L. REV. 299, 300 (1977).
67. See, e.g., Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 392 (1976) (construing Pub. L. No.
280 narrowly to uphold Indian immunity from state tax); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535
(1974) (upholding hiring preference statute against equal rights challenge); Menominee Tribe of
Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968) (holding that the Termination Act did not extinguish treaty hunting rights); Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1 (1956) (construing Indian General
Allotment Act to confer a federal income tax immunity on allotment property); United States
v. White, 508 F.2d 453 (8th Cir. 1974) (finding traditional on-reservation eagle hunting not illegal under Bald Eagle Protection Act); F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 225; LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, supra note 33, at 9, 16-17.
68. Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 14, at 626.
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limit the canons of statutory construction to statutes "dealing with
Indian affairs." 69 Yet, this second theory of the canons may be quite
broad, as Indians or Indian affairs can be "affected" by statutes of
general applicability. 70
The Supreme Court, applying the canons to a unilateral federal act
in a recent decision, described the canons as "applicable to statutes
affecting Indian immunities. " 11 The Court also required statutes "passed
for the benefit" of Indians to be construed liberally. 72
Whatever their exact latitude, the canons of statutory construction
certainly apply to statutes specifically concerning Indians. The canons
probably apply further to statutes of general applicability that impair
Indian interests. 73
4. The Indian treaty abrogation canon- Congress has the authority
to abrogate or modify federal-Indian treaties or the trust itself. 74
Nonetheless, courts construe legislation abrogating treaty rights very
narrowly, 75 for the extinguishment of treaty rights has a highly destructive effect on Indian culture and tribal sovereignty. 76
The treaty abrogation canon differs from the canons of treaty and
statutory construction. The abrogation canon determines whether an
acknowledged treaty right still exists, while the construction canons
determine whether a right will be acknowledged, and what the scope
of that right is.

69. See F. COHEN, supra note I, at 224.
70. See Federal Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99 (1960); see generally
Brecher, Federal Regulatory Statutes and Indian Self-Determination: Some Problems and Some
Proposed Legislative Solutions, 19 ARIZ. L. REV. 285 (1977).
71. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 381 (1976).
72. Id. at 392.
73. See generally United States v. White, 508 F.2d 453 (8th Cir. 1974); Brecher, supra note
70, at 293. But see Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1972) (holding that costly NEPA
requirements apply to tribal leases).
74. See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903); H.R. Con. Res. 108, 67 Stat. B132
(1953). For a comprehensive treatment of the treaty abrogation power and canon, see Wilkinson
& Volkman, supra note 14. Congress' unilateral power to abrogate treaties is one reason why
the federal-Indian trust is often referred to as a moral rather than legal obligation. See Chambers,
supra note I, at 1227.
75. The exact standard varies. Compare Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391
U.S. 404, 413 (1968) (stating that congressional intent to abrogate federal-Indian treaties "is
not lightly imputed") with United States v. Shoshone Tribe of Indians, 304 U.S. 111, 118 (1938)
(asserting that courts will uphold abrogation only upon a "clear showing" of congressional intent). Leading commentators advocate a canon requiring courts to uphold federal-Indian treaties
unless Congress expressly states its intention to abrogate, and specifies which treaty rights are
involved. See Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 14, at 645; see generally Note, Statutory
Construction-Wildlife Protection Versus Indian Treaty Hunting Rights: United States v. Fryberg,
622 F.2d 10/0 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1004 (1980, 57 WASH. L. REV. 225 (1981).
76. See Clinton, supra note 10, at 1040-41; Chambers, supra note I, at 1235-36; TASK FORCE
Two, supra note 10, at 77; Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 14, at 604-05; see also MESSAGE
FROM THE PRESIDENT, supra note 23.
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Judicial Tradition of Applying the Canons of Construction

The canons of construction operate as trust principles rather than
as political techniques accommodating treaties to government policy.
The principles underlying the canons are not abandoned with policy
changes. 77 Since the first formulation of the canons of construction,
the federal policy towards Indians has vacillated between attempts to
assimilate Indians into mainstream American society, and efforts to
promote the autonomy of Indian Nations. 78 When assimilation policies
conflicted with treaty provisions guaranteeing Indian autonomy, 79 the
courts continued nevertheless to construe treaty provisions in favor of
Indian understanding. The reserved rights doctrine, for example, was
formulated during a period in which federal legislative policy deliberately
fostered the erosion of tribal sovereignty. 80
The assimilation period from 1871-1934 81 witnessed a decrease in
bilateral negotiations and an increase in unilateral federal acts affecting Indians. The courts continued to enforce federal trust obligations
by extending the canons of treaty construction to congressional
legislation. 82 For over 150 years, these principles of interpretation have
77. During the first assimilation period (1871-1934), the Supreme Court upheld a federal
promise rendering Indian land allotments non-taxable despite a congressional act removing the
promised tax immunity. Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665 (1912); see also Winters v. United States,
207 U.S. 564 (1908) (using canons to find that Congress intended to include water rights when
setting aside Indian reservations); Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. I (1899) (formulating the canon
requiring treaties to be construed as Indians understood them).
78. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1976); 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-358 (1982); 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-450n
(1982); H.R. Con. Res. 108, 67 Stat. Bl32 (1953); S. REP. No. 561, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1972);
FINAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 51-82; MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT, supra note 23; R. BARSH
& 1. HENDERSON, supra note 12; V. DELORIA, JR. & C. LYTLE, supra note 12, at 9-10; w.
WASHBURN, supra note 10, at 240; Clinton, supra note 10, at 1020-27; Goldberg, Public Law
280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction Over Reservation Indians, 22 UCLA L. REV. 535 (1975);
Wilkinson & Biggs, The Evolution of the Termination Policy, AM. IND. L. REV. 139 (1978);
Comment, Tribal Se/f-Goverment and the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 70 MICH. L. REV.
955 (1972).
79. E.g., Treaty of New Echota, Dec. 29, 1835, 7 Stat. 478 (Cherokee); Treaty of Dancing
Rabbit Creek, Sept. 27, 1830, 7 Stat. 333-34 (Choctaw). These treaties conveyed land to the
tribes in fee simple, pledging that "no part of the land granted shall ever be embraced in any
territory or state." Such provisions assume continued Indian autonomy.
80. In United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905), the Court read a treaty phrase guaranteeing
"the right of taking fish at all usual and accustomed places" as imposing a servitude on all
the land granted to the United States by the signatory Indians. Id. at 381. Using the principles
of treaty construction as the basis for determining the contested Indian-non-Indian rights, the
Court elevated federal recognition of inherent tribal autonomy to doctrinal status. See generally
Comment, Pacific Northwest Indian Treaty Fishing Rights, 5 U. PUGET SouND L. REV. 99, 103-04
(1981).
81. M. PRICE & R. CLINTON, supra note 9, at 77.
82. In Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 89 (1918), the Supreme Court
construed an 1891 statute establishing a reservation to include surrounding navigable waters and
beds despite a strong general presumption against federal conveyance of such submerged lands.
See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. I (1894) (announcing the equal-footing doctrine). The Court

SPRING

1984)

Indian Canons

693

been applied to construe treaty provisions conveying land "to be held
as Indian lands are held" as insulating Indian hunting and fishing from
state regulation, 83 to combine general treaty promises and historical
circumstances into a conveyance of submerged riverbeds, 84 and to ensure valuable water rights to otherwise "lifeless" Indian reservation
lands. 85
II.

RECENT SUPREME COURT RETREAT FROM USE OF THE
CANONS OF CONSTRUCTION

Since the late 1970s, the Supreme Court's use of the canons of construction has become haphazard. The Court has given little weight to
Indian understanding in construing treaties. 86 In interpreting ambiguous
statutory provisions, the Court has often given no special consideration to Indian interests. 87
applied the canons to require that "statutes passed for the benefit of dependent Indian tribes
or communities are to be liberally construed." 248 U.S. at 79.
Application of the equal-footing doctrine to Indian treaty cases has been severely criticized.
See Barsh & Henderson, supra note 5; Note, Montana v. United States - Effects on Liberal
Treaty Interpretation and Indian Rights to Lands Underlying Navigable Waters, 57 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 689 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note, Effects on Treaty Rights]; Note, Riverbed Ownership Law Metamorphosed Into A Determinant of Tribal Regulatory Authority - Montana v.
United States, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 264 [hereinafter cited as Note, Riverbed Ownership).
83. Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968).
84. Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620 (1970).
85. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 598-601 (1963); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S.
564 (1908).
There have been exceptions to the overall strength of the canons in interpretation of Indian
treaties and statutes. For example, in Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1896), the Court construed a treaty provision guaranteeing "the right to hunt upon the unoccupied lands of the United
States so long as game may be found thereon" as temporary, ending when a territory became
a state. This construction violated the canon requiring the treaty to be construed as the Indians
would have understood it. See also United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1926). See
generally Barsh & Henderson, supra note 5, at 666-69; Comment, supra note 40, at 76.
86. See infra notes 150-60 and accompanying text.
87. See, e.g., Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation,
439 U.S. 463 (1979). The Court now balances state, federal, and tribal interests, an approach
which sometimes neglects inherent tribal powers in violation of the reserved rights doctrine. See
Rice v. Rehner, 103 S. Ct. 3291 (1983). See generally Pelcyger, Justices and Indians: Back to
Basics, 62 OR. L. REv. 29 (1983).
Until the late I 970s the canons of construction enjoyed considerable judicial respect in the
Supreme Court. See, e.g., Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976) (using canons to uphold
on-reservation Indian immunity from state tax); Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 195 (1975)
(using canons to uphold Indian hunting rights); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n,
411 U.S. 164 (1973) (using canons to uphold on-reservation Indian immunity from state tax);
Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968) (using canons to uphold Indian treaty fishing and hunting rights); Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. I (1956) (using canons
to immunize Indian allotment property from federal taxation); United States v. Shoshone Tribe
of Indians, 304 U.S. 111 (1938) (using canons to find federal recognition of beneficial Indian
rights to land); Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 227 U.S. 355 (1913) (using canons to
determine boundary); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908) (using canons to create reserved
water rights doctrine).
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Although the Court has failed to use the canons in some cases, it
has never expressly repudiated them. Instead, the Court has effectively
redefined the purpose and importance of the canons by ignoring or
superficially employing the principles.
I. Neglect of the canons results in the limitation of tribal
sovereignty- The Supreme Court first indicated a change of attitude
towards the canons of construction in 1978. In Oliphant v. Suquamish
Indian Tribe 88 the Court rejected the claim that an Indian tribe had
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians on the reservation. The claim
was based on inherent sovereignty rather than on statutory or treaty
rights. 89 The Court reasoned from early congressional acts that Congress never considered the possiblity of inherent tribal jurisdiction. 90
The Court then concluded that Congress would not have passed acts
limiting state jurisdiction over Indians while allowing tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians. In looking to such an "unspoken [congressional]
assumption," 9 ' the Court wholly failed to give effect to the canon of
statutory construction requiring ambiguous statutory language to be
construed in favor of Indians. 92
The Court in Oliphant also disregarded the basic canons of treaty
construction. Stating that federal treaties with the tribes "can be read" 93
as an implicit proscription of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians,
the Court failed to apply the principle requiring ambiguous treaties
to be construed in favor of Indians. 94
88. 435 U.S. 191 (1978). Oliphant and Belgarde, two non-Indian residents arrested by tribal
officers, were charged with committing tribal offenses. Both petitioned for writs of habeas corpus to the federal district court, pleading that the tribal court had no jurisdiction over nonIndians. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's denial of Oliphant's petition. The
court reasoned that no federal statute or treaty had deprived the tribe of its power to punish
tribal law offenders. Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007 (9th Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Oliphant
v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). Belgarde's petition for certiorari was granted
before the court of appeals had reviewed his case. 435 U.S. at 195 n.5. See Note, Indian Rights
- What's Left? Oliphant, Tribal Courts, and Non-Indians, 41 U. PITT. L. REv. 75, 79 (1979).
89. 435 U.S. at 195-96. At least 30 tribes were exercising criminal jurisdiction powers over
non-Indians at the time of the Oliphant decisions. See M. PRICE & R. CLINTON, supra note 9,
at 275. Oliphant dealt a severe blow to tribal government and to the federal policy of Indian
self-determination. Note, supra note 88, at 75.
90. 435 U.S. at 197, 201. The Court further reasoned that because the Major Crimes Act
of 1885, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1982), conferred exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts over
Indians committing certain criminal acts, it would be illogical for Congress to have left jurisdiction over non-Indians in the tribe. 435 U.S. at 203. The Court concluded that Congress assumed
that Indians never had jurisdiction over non-Indians. Id. at 204.
91. Id. at 203.
92. See Barsh & Henderson, supra note 5, at 675.
93. 435 U.S. at 197 n.8.
94. Early treaties provided that "[iJf any citizen of the United States ... shall attempt to
settle on any of the land hereby allotted to the Indians to live and hunt on, such person shall
forfeit the protection of the United States of America, and the Indians may punish him or not
as they please." Treaty with the Choctaws, Jan. 3, 1786, art. IV, 7 Stat. 21, quoted in 435
U.S. at 197 n.8. Such treaty provisions, drawn when parity in power still marked Indian-federal
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The Court's clearest withdrawal from the canons lay in its statement that Indian treaties must be interpreted "in light of . . . the
assumptions of those who drafted them. " 95 The drafter was, according to the Court, "the Executive Branch" 96 of the federal government. The Court's rule of interpretation conflicts directly with wellestablisned authority that treaties be construed as the Indians would
have understood them. 97 Finally, the Court ignored the reserved rights
doctrine by assuming that the tribe had no inherent sovereign criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians on the reservation.
2. Piecemeal application of the canons invites non-Indian intrusion and results in uncertainty over Indian fishing rights- The Supreme
Court in 1979 signaled further uncertainty over the status of the canons
in Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing
Vessel Association. 98 In construing a treaty phrase reserving to tribes
of the Pacific Northwest the right to fish at "all usual and accustomed
grounds and stations ... in common with all citizens of the territory, " 99
the Court first analyzed the intent of both parties, and applied the
canons of construction to interpret the treaty provision as the Indians
understood it. 100
The Court recognized that the purpose and language of the treaty
provision clearly secured the Indians' rights to a portion of salmon
and steelhead running through tribal fishing areas. 101 The Court did
not, however, apply the canons in determining the actual percentage
of fish the Indians could take. 102 Rather the Court created a variable
standard for calculating the percentage. 103 This standard infringes on
relations, were unambiguous acknowledgement of the mutual sovereignty of the bargaining nations. See supra, part I. Overlooking the canon requiring treaties to be construed liberally in
favor of Indians, the Court interpreted these treaty passages as merely an attempt to discourage
non-Indian settlement.
95. 435 U.S. at 206 (emphasis added).
96. Id.
97. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); see supra note 57-64 and accompanying text.
98. 443 U.S. 658 (1979). See generally Vessels, Treaties: Fishing Rights in the Pacific Northwest - The Supreme Court "Legislates" an Equitable Solution, 8 AM. IND. L. REV. 117 (1980);
Comment, supra note 80; Comment, supra note 40.
99. Treaty of Medicine Creek, Dec. 26, 1854, art. III, 10 Stat. 1132, I 134 (emphasis added).
100. See 443 U.S. at 675-79.
IOI. See id. at 662, 667-69.
102. The Court did not use the canons at least in part because it concluded that "neither
party realized or intended that their agreement would determine whether, and if so how, [the
fish) would be allocated . . . when [they) later became scarce." Id. at 669.
103. The Court determined Indian fishing rights to be a maximum of 50%, subject to decrease,
of the annual anadromous fish runs. This included non-commercial subsistence and religious
fishing. Id. at 685-89. The district court formula allocated both Indians and non-Indians up
to 50% of the harvestable run; Indian religious and subsistence fishing would not be included
as part of the tribes' "up to" 50% portion. United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312,
342-43 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff'd, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976).
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Indian sovereignty by encouraging continued attempts by non-Indians
to decrease the tribes' share. 104
The Court's variable standard for determining fishing rights conflicted with the very canon it had used to interpret the ambiguous treaty
provision guaranteeing those rights. The Court's holding also undermined the reserved rights doctrine. 105 Except for the initial treaty construction that the Court considered to be mandated by precedent, 106
the canons played but a nominal role in the actual decision.
3. Disregarding the canons results in unwanted extension of state
jurisdiction over Indian Country- The Supreme Court in 1979 also
retreated from application of the canons to statutory provisions. In
Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Indian
Nation 101 the Court held that the state of Washington had fulfilled
all the federal statutory requirements necessary to assert state jurisdiction over the Yakima Reservation. 108 The Yakima Nation argued that
The measurement used by the Court to allocate rights was designed to ensure the Indians
a "moderate living." 443 U.S. at 686. The Supreme Court extrapolated this standard from water
rights cases such as Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 598-601 (1963).
104. Non-Indian pressures to change the portions of fish can result in federal intrusion into
tribal affairs to determine whether less fish are needed to maintain the moderate living standard.
See Clinton, supra note 5, at 444-45; Comment, supra note 80, at I 18-20. But see Vessels, supra
note 98, at 132-34. Further, the unstable nature of the standard contravenes documented Indian
concern during treaty negotiations to preserve religious and subsistence fishing needs. United
States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 343 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff'd, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1076 (1976).
105. Indian understanding would have included neiiher the agreement to close federal monitoring of internal tribal affairs nor the agreement that religious fishing depend on a moderate Jiving
standard. The reserved rights doctrine should have required the Court to develop a plan for
fishing rights allocation which would have better preserved the tribes' reserved sovereignty and
cultural-religious needs. The resulting conflict over Indian and non-Indian fishing rights has led
to violence against the fishing tribes. See E. CAHN, OuR BROTHER'S KEEPER 76-77 (1969); V.
DELORIA, JR., supra note 10, at 25-29.
106. Ironically, the reserved rights doctrine was announced in the first of the seven Pacific
Northwest fishing rights cases. See United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905); see also Puyallup
Tribe Inc. v. Washington Game Dep't, 433 U.S. 165 (1977); Washington Game Dep't v. Puyallup
Tribe, 414 U.S. 44 (1973); Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game, 391 U.S. 391 (1968); Tulee
v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681 (1942); Seufert Bros. Co. v. United States, 249 U.S. 194 (1919).
107. 439 U.S. 463 (1979).
108. Section 6 of Pub. L. No. 83-280, Act of Aug. 15, 1953, 67 Stat. 590, allows states
with statutory or constitutional provisions disclaiming jurisdiction over Indian country to assume
jurisdiction provided that "the people thereof have appropriately amended their State constitution or statutes as the case may be." Section 7 of Pub. L. 280, empowered states without constitutional or statutory disclaimers to assert jurisdiction "at such time and in such manner as
the people of the State shall, by affirmative legislative action, obligate and bind the State to
assumption thereof." See 439 U.S. at 472-74. Section 7 was repealed by Title IV of the Act
of April 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 406(b), 82 Stat. 79. The repeal did not affect any
cession of jurisdiction made under § 7 prior to its repeal.
The Washington State Constitution contained a disclaimer of authority over Indian Country.
WASH. CONST. art. XXVI, § 2. Washington enacted a statute obligating the state to assume jurisdiction over any tribe requesting it, without amending its constitution. WASH. REV. CODE, ch. 37 .12
(1976). Jurisdiction was upheld by the Washington Supreme Court, which construed § 6 as not
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the relevant federal statute established a distinct procedure requiring
state constitutional amendment before the state asserted jurisdiction
over Indian Country. 1 09 Although the Court recognized the canon that
legislative ambiguities affecting retained tribal sovereignty must be construed in favor of the tribe, 110 the Court rendered the canon meaningless by requiring the federal statute unambiguously to affect the
state's amendment procedure before invoking the canon. 111 In holding
for the state of Washington, the Court ignored the canon of statutory
construction that Congress acts to benefit Indians. Instead, the Court
interpreted congressional silence to favor state interests in limiting federal
intrusion into state government procedures. 112

4. Ignoring canons of construction results in the bankruptcy of
Indian-owned businesses- In 1980, the Supreme Court in Andrus v.
Glover Construction Company' 13 retreated further from application of
the canons of construction and substituted ordinary construction rules
to interpret a general federal statute adversely affecting Indian
interests. 114 The Court construed the Buy Indian Act (the Act)' ,s to
requiring the state to amend its constitution where its legislature had passed a statute accepting
jurisdiction. State v. Paul, 53 Wash. 2d 789, 337 P.2d 33 (1959). Washington later enacted a
statute automatically extending state jurisdiction in eight categories to all parts of every reservation, whether requested by the tribe or not. WASH. REV. CODE§ 37.12.010 (1976). The Yakima
Nation did not request state jurisdiction, and challenged the Washington legislation on three
grounds: that Washington was required by § 6 of Pub. L. 280 to amend its Constitution by action
of "the people," 439 U.S. at 476, before assuming jurisdiction, that Pub. L. 280 did not authorize
assumption of partial jurisdiction, and that the Washington legislation violated the Fourteenth
Amendment. See 439 U.S. at 474-78. The Court held against the Yakima Nation on all three
issues. Id. at 493, 499, 502. See generally Goldberg, supra note 78.
109. See 439 U.S. at 466-67.
"Indian Country" is defined as:
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the
United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including
rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities
within the boarders [sic) of the United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a State,
and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished,
including rights-of-way running through the same.
18 u.s.c. § 1151 (1976).
110. 439 U.S. at 484.
11 I. The Court stated that "[the canons) will not stretch so far as to permit us to find a
federal requirement affecting the manner in which the States are to modify their organic legislation . . . . " Id. at 485.
112. Erosion of the canons of construction was also apparent in the Court's construction
of the federal law to favor partial state jurisdiction over Indian country. The Court failed to
mention the canons of construction even superficially and ignored authority that the relevant
statute was not intended to allow partial state jurisdiction. See 439 U.S. at 502-07 (Marshall,
J., dissenting); see generally Goldberg, supra note 78.
113. 446 U.S. 608 (1980); see generally Casenote, United States Supreme Court Review of
Tenth Circuit Decisions - Andrus v. Glover Construction Co. 58 DEN. L.J. 531, 538-39 (1981).
114. General legislation can significantly impair Indian interests. See, e.g., Manygoats v. Kleppe,
558 F.2d 556 (10th Cir. 1977).
115. The Buy Indian Act, 25 U.S.C. § 47 (1982), provides that, "[s)o far as may be prac-
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determine whether the Act conferred authority on the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) to engage in preferential road-contracting practices
without first advertising for bids as required by the Federal Property
and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (FP ASA). 116
The BIA procurement policy 111 conflicted with a 1965 general amendment to FP ASA requiring the BIA to advertise publicly for bids
when making purchases or contracting for supplies and services. 118 Prior
to the 1965 FP ASA amendment, the Act exempted the BIA from such
general bidding requirements, 119 thus promoting Indian employment
and decreasing Indian economic dependence on the federal
government. 120 The BIA argued that the Act also exempted the agency
policy for FPASA requirements. 121
Applying ordinary rules of statutory construction, the Court concluded that the BIA procurement policy was not exempt from bid advertising requirements. 122 The FPASA amendment did provide an exemption for the Act's authorization to purchase "product[s] of Indian
industry." 123 The Court, however, was uncertain whether roads built
by Indian-owned companies could be considered "products" under the
Act. The canons of construction were not applied to resolve that issue.
Instead, the Court focused on another provision of FPASA requiring
bid advertising for all road construction contract negotiations with certain expressed exceptions which did not include the Act. 124 The Court
concluded that FP ASA provisions included the BIA and thus required
advertisement for road contracting services. 125
ticable Indian labor shall be employed, and purchases of the products of Indian industry may
be made in open market in the discretion of the Secretary of the Interior."
I 16. 41 U.S.C. §§ 251-260 (1976).
117. The BIA policy required it to determine that there were "no qualified Indian contractors within the normal competitive area that can fill or are interested in filling the procurement
requirement" before dealing with non-Indians. 446 U.S. at 609.
I 18. 41 U.S.C. § 252(c) (1976).
119. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 431, § 23, 36 Stat. 861, quoted and construed in 446 U.S.
608, 612 n.8, 613 n.11 (1980).
120. See 446 U.S. 608, 618 (1980); see generally Morton v. Mancari 417 U.S. 535, 549-551
(1974); Chambers, Brief for Amici Curiae at 7, Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608 (1980).
121. See 446 U.S. at 617.
122. The Court used general interpretation rules presuming that absent contrary legislative
intent, additional exceptions are not implied where Congress has explicitly enumerated exceptions
to a general prohibition, 446 U.S. at 616-17, and that courts must reconcile conflicting statutes
to make each effective, unless Congress indicates otherwise. 446 U.S. at 618-19.
123. 25 U.S.C. § 47 (1982).
124. 41 U.S.C. § 252(e) (1976). The Buy Indian Act was exempted under FPASA § 252(c)(15)
as a law authorizing unadvertised purchases. This would have allowed the BIA to award road
contracts to Indian-owned companies without advertising if road construction were an "Indian
product." The Court found it unnecessary to interpret the scope of the "Indian product" authorization because FPASA § 252(e) expressly required advertising for road construction contracts. Section 252(e) provided exceptions, but § 252(c)(I5) was not among them. See 446 U.S. at 615-19.
125. 446 U.S. at 616.
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Making only a passing reference to the canons of construction, the
Court found them unnecessary because the meaning of the legislation
conflicting with the Buy Indian Act was "plain." 126 The Court's use
of general interpretive rules indicated, however, that there was indeed
some ambiguity. The decision represented a significant failure of the
federal-Indian trust relationship by elevating federal interests in limiting
'"high cost' construction" 121 above aid to Indian economic development and independence. 128

5. Failure to apply the canons limits government accountability for
Indian resources mismanagement- In a second opinion in 1980 the
Court displaced the canons of construction by general legal presumptions. In Mitchell v. United States (Mitchell/), 129 an Indian tribe and
tribal members 130 brought suit against the federal government for
damages arising from alleged mismanagement of reservation
timberlands. The Indians argued that the Indian General Allotment
Act of 1887, or Dawes Act, 131 created a trust relationship between the
Indians and the federal government that implied a cause of action for
fiduciary breach. Focusing on the government's sovereign immunity
defense 132 rather than the tribe's breach of trust claim, the Court invoked a rule of interpretation requiring strict construction in favor of
preserving immunity. 133

126. 446 U.S. at 618.
127. 446 U.S. at 612 (quoting Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 591 F.2d 554, 562 (10th Cir.
1979)).
128. The holding in Glover Construction Co. led to the bankruptcy of numerous Indianowned companies dependent on Buy Indian Act contracts, resulting in increased Indian unemployment. See Brief for Petitioner, Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608 (1980); Van Ness,
Jr., Brief for Amicus Curiae at 33, Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608 (1980) (reporting that after the Court of Appeals decision, BIA road construction contracts to Indian firms
dropped $9 million although total BIA road construction increased $10 million).
129. 445 U.S. 535 (1980). For analysis and criticism of Mitchell I, see M. PRICE & R. CLINTON, supra note 9, at 202; Hughes, Can the Trustee Be Sued For Its Breach? The Sad Saga
of United States v. Mitchell, 26 S.D.L. REV. 447 (1981); Newton, Enforcing the Federal-Indian
Trust Relationship After Mitchell, 31 CATH. U.L. REV. 635 (1982); Comment, Indian Law Remedies - Statutory Construction - Trusts - United States v. Mitchell, 27 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV.
610 (1981).
130. The Quinault respondents included 1465 individuals owning interests in Quinault Reservation allotments, an unincorporated association of Quinault Reservation allottees, and the Quinault
Tribe. 445 U.S. 535, 537 (1980).
131. 25 U.S.C. § 331-358 (1982). The lands were allotted under the Dawes Act with a
twenty-five year trust restriction. The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 extended the trust status
indefinitely. 25 U.S.C. § 462 (1982). See generally F. COHEN, supra note I, at 148; Comment,
supra, note 78. The Quinaults argued that the Dawes Act created a trust relationship between
the Indians and the federal government which was breached by the Secretary of Interior's failure
to perform several management acts adequately.
132. See 445 U.S. at 538; see also Mitchell II, 103 S. Ct. 2961 (1983) (rejecting language
in Mitchell I suggesting that the Tucker Act does not effect a waiver of sovereign immunity).
133. See 445 U.S. at 538; M. PRICE & R. CLINTON, supra note 9, at 202; Newton, supra
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Although the Court acknowledged that the Dawes Act "did not unambiguously'' impose full fiduciary responsibilities on the federal
government, 134 it did not apply the canons of Indian statutory
construction. 135 The Court instead interpreted language in the Dawes
Act that required the United States to "hold the land ... in trust" 136
merely to restrain alienation and prevent state taxation, and not to
create a broad fiduciary duty. 137 The Court concluded that "[a]ny right
of the [Indians] to recover money damages ... must be found in some
source other than [the Dawes] Act." 138 Replacing the canons of construction in favor of Indians with a presumption against waiver of
sovereign immunity, the Court denied the Indians their chance to argue
the merits of the breach of trust claim. 139
6. Comparing use of the canons to enforce and non use of the canons
to deny Indian treaty claims- Two Supreme Court cases decided ten
years apart graphically illustrate the changing influence of the canons
of construction. Both cases required the construction of treaty provisions to determine ownership- of navigable riverbeds in the face of a
strong presumption against federal conveyance of submerged lands.
Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 140 decided in 1970, framed the issue with
the canons of construction and found tribal ownership of a portion
of the Arkansas riverbed. Montana v. United States, 141 decided in 1981,
neglected even to mention the canons and found that the tribe did not
own the contested portion of the Big Horn riverbed.
In Choctaw, three tribes sued the state of Oklahoma to recover royalty
payments made to the state under mineral and gas leases in the riverbed and to enjoin future interference with tribal property rights. The
note 129, at 656-57; Comment, supra note 129, at 620; see also, Hughes, supra note 129, at
473, 481, 487.
134. 445 U.S. at 542.
135. See id. at 542-46. Imposition of the presumption against waiver of sovereign immunity
resulted in an "unusually" strict construction of the legislation. Hughes, supra note 129, at 481;
see M. PRICE & R. CLINTON, supra note 9, at 202.
136. 24 Stat. 389 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 348 (1982)), quoted in 445 U.S. at 541.
137. 445 U.S. at 540-46. Commentators criticizing the Court's narrow reading of the Indian
General Allotment Act as limiting the federal-Indian trusteeship, e.g., Newton, supra note 129,
at 680-81, have suggested two possible reasons for the Court's refusal to recognize a waiver
of sovereign immunity. First, the Indian General Allotment Act was designed to assimilate the
Indians and thus end the trust relationship. See M. PRICE & R. CLINTON, supra note 9, at 202.
Second, courts narrowly construe waivers of sovereign immunity. Comment, supra note 129, at 620.
138. 445 U.S. at 546.
139. The Quinaults' claim against the federal government was for approximately $100 million.
Mitchell II, 103 S.Ct. 2961, 2965 n. 7 (1983). On remand, the Court of Claims found the Quinaults
had a cause of action against the United States based on fiduciary duties imposed by federal
statutes governing timber management, road building, and rights-of-way; statutes governing Indian funds and government fees; and various regulations. United States v. Mitchell, 664 F.2d
265 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (en bane), aff'd and remanded, 103 S. Ct. 2961 (1983).
140. 397 U.S. 620 (1970).
141. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
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tribes claimed ownership of the leased riverbeds under treaties concluded in the 1830s. 142
•
Two relevant treaties conveyed land to the tribes in fee simple, pledging that "no part of the land granted shall ever be embraced in any
territory or state." 143 Land boundaries in one treaty encompassed a
portion of the Arkansas River without expressly including it, and
described the southern line as "down the Arkansas." 144 The second
treaty also expressly used the Arkansas to delineate the boundaries of
the land grant. 145 Neither party disputed that if the United States owned
the Arkansas riverbed, title to the riverbed inured to Oklahoma upon
statehood in 1904. 146
The Indian claims conflicted with a strong presumption that riverbeds
were held in federal trust for future states. 147 The Court, however, applied the canons of construction and emphasized the broken federal
promises leading to the tribes' forced removal to Oklahoma to overcome the presumption and find that the tribes owned the contested
riverbed. 148 The Choctaw message was clear; treaty and fiduciary obligations would be enforced through the construction canons. 149
In contrast, ten years later in Montana the Court disregarded the
canons in determining ownership of a portion of the bed of the Big
Horn River. 1 so The Montana dispute arose from a Crow tribal council
attempt to regulate non-Indian fishing and hunting on lands within
the reservation, including those owned in fee simple by non-Indians. 1st
Asking declaratory relief, the tribe claimed regulatory authority on the

142. See Treaty of New Echota, Dec. 29, 1835, 7 Stat. 478 (Cherokee); Treaty of Dancing
Rabbit Creek, Sept. 27, 1830, 7 Stat. 333 (Choctaw); Treaty of Doak's Stand, Oct. 18, 1820,
7 Stat. 210 (Choctaw).
The tribes disagreed on the portion of the riverbed each tribe owned under the treaties. The
court declined to resolve that dispute. 397 U.S. at 630 n.7.
143. Treaty of New Echota, Dec. 29, 1835, 7 Stat. 478 (Cherokee); Treaty of Dancing Rabbit
Creek, Sept. 27, 1830, 7 Stat. 333-34 (Choctaw).
144. Treaty of New Echota, 7 Stat. at 480; see 397 U.S. at 628-30.
145. Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek, 7 Stat. at 333; Treaty of Doak's Stand, 7 Stat. at
211; see 397 U.S. at 629.
146. See 397 U.S. at 628; see generally Barsh & Henderson, supra note 5; Hanna, Equal
Footing In the Admission of States, 3 BAYLOR L. REV. 519 (1951).
147. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. I (1894). See generally Hanna, supra note 146.
148. See 397 U.S. at 622-27, 634-36.
149. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
150. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). This decision has been heavily criticized.
See generally Barsh & Henderson, supra note 5; Bloxham, Tribal Sovereignty: An Analysis of
Montana v. United States, 8 AM. IND. L. REV. 175 (1980); Clinton, supra note 5; Note, Indian
Law-Ownership of Riverbeds and Limits to Tribal Sovereignty, 17 LAND AND WATER L. REV.
189 (1982); Note, Effects on Treaty Rights, supra note 82; Note, Riverbed Ownership, supra
note 82.
15 I. Crow Tribal Council Resolution 74-05, quoted in Note, Riverbed Ownership, supra note
82, at 283 n.118.
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basis of its inherent sovereignty and ownership by treaty of the bed
and banks of the Big Horn River running through the reservation. 152
The Court held that the United States had not conveyed beneficial
ownership to the tribe by treaty, and thus retained ownership for the
state. 153 Because the tribe in Montana did not receive land from the
United States in exchange for the tribe's original land, 154 but rather
had conveyed original title to the United States, 155 the Court effectively violated the reserved rights doctrine by characterizing the treaty as
a grant from the United States.
Further, the Court's analysis in Montana failed to consider whether
the signatory tribe intended to give up ownership of the Big Horn riverbed and banks. 156 Without applying the canons, the Court found that
treaty language reserving to the tribe "the absolute and undisturbed
use and occupation" 157 of the land surrounding the river was insufficient to signify Indian ownership of the riverbed. Finally, the Court
required the tribe to overcome the presumption against conveyance of
the riverbed. 158 Such a presumption departs from both the letter and
the spirit of the canons which require that treaties be read to favor
Indians. 159 Following the post-1978 cases retreating from the canons,
the Court allowed considerations of federal and state policy to prevail
in construing ambiguities affecting important Indian rights and
interests. 160

152. As in Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620 (1970), the treaty described the reservation by metes and bounds. See Second Treaty of Fort Laramie, May 7, 1868, art. II, 15 Stat. 650.
153. 450 U.S. at 550-51; see Barsh & Henderson, supra note 5, at 675.
154. The tribes in Choctaw had been forcibly removed from their original land in Southeastern
United States and given land in present-day Oklahoma. See Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397
U.S. 620, 622-27 (1970); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation
v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) I (1831).
155. See 450 U.S. at 547-48.
156. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun employed the canons of construction and
concluded that the Crow Tribe would have understood the treaties to include the bed and banks
of the Big Horn River. 450 U.S. at 569-81 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
157. Second Treaty of Fort Laramie, May 7, 1868, art. II, 15 Stat. 649 (1868), quoted in
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. at 548.
158. 450 U.S. at 553.
159. The Court reasoned that the treaty language could not mean what it appeared to mean,
for the navigation easement retained by the United States in all navigable waters meant that
"exclusive occupancy" could not literally be exclusive. Because no express language conveyed
the riverbed, the Court concluded that "whatever property rights the language of the 1868 treaty
created, ... its language is not strong enough to overcome the presumption against the sovereign's
conveyance of the riverbed." 450 U.S. at 554.
160. The Court attempted to minimize the striking differences between Choctaw v. Oklahoma,
397 U.S. 620 (1970) and Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981), by distinguishing Choctaw in a footnote as an exception based on peculiar circumstances. 450 U.S. at 555 n.5. The
differing results are better understood as the consequence of the diminishing role of the canons
of construction. See also 450 U.S. at 457-69 (Stevens, J., concurring). See generally Barsh &
Henderson, supra note 5, at 678-81.
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PROPOSAL FOR CODIFICATION OF THE
CANONS OF CONSTRUCTION

Recent Supreme Court decisions indicate that the judiciary no longer
considers application of the canons of construction to be a critical aspect
of the federal-Indian trust relationship. Codification of the canons would
reaffirm the canons' central importance in federal-Indian relations and
would require their application as a matter of substantive law.

A.

The Canons of Construction: Contemporary Justification

Judicial reluctance to employ the canons of construction conflicts
with current federal goals that emphasize aid to strengthen Indian
cultures and standards of living. In the 1960s, Congress and the executive branch began to advocate a policy combining recognition of
Indian autonomy with federal assistance to develop viable reservation
economies. 161 Entitled, "self-determination," this federal policy encourages Indians and tribes to strengthen tribal autonomy, develop selfsufficient economies, and determine their own future actions. 162 In the
last two decades, Congress has enacted legislation designed to give tribes
a more decisive role in matters affecting Indians and to provide the
financial means to achieve economic self-sufficiency. 163
161. See Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1982); Indian SelfDetermination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-450a (1982); Indian Financing Act of 1974, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1543 (1982); Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-280
(establishing the American Indian Policy Review Commission); 25 U .S.C. § 1326 (1982) (prohibiting, as part of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341 (1982), states
from assuming jurisdiction over Indian Country under Pub. L. 280 without tribal consent); 28
U.S.C. § 1362 (1982) (waiving the amount in controversy requirement for federal district court
jurisdiction for recognized tribes); F. COHEN, supra note I, at 180-206; V. DELORIA, JR., &
c. LYTLE, supra note 12, at 21-25; s. LEVITAN & w. JOHNSTON, INDIAN GIVING FEDERAL PROGRAMS FOR NATIVE AMERICANS 72-80 (1975); M. PRICE & R. CLINTON, supra note 9, at 86-90;
W. WASHBURN, supra note 10, at 243-45; Clinton, supra note 10; Israel, supra note 4; TASK
FORCE NINE, supra note 14, at 22-23; Wilkinson, Shall the Islands Be Preserved?, 16 AM. W.,
June-July 1979, at 32. See also Ickes, Tribal Economic Independence - The Means to Achieve
True Tribal Self-Determination, 26 S.D.L. REV. 494 (1981).
Former President Nixon was an especially vocal advocate of Indian self-determination policies.
"[T]he United States government acts as a legal trustee for the land and water rights of American
Indians [and has] a legal obligation to advance the interests of the beneficiaries of the trust
without reservation and with the highest degree of diligence and skill." MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT, supra note 23, at 9-10. President Ford also supported a policy of encouraging Indian
autonomy while preserving the federal-Indian trust. See 12 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1171
(July 16, 1976), quoted in Israel, supra note 4, at 628.
162. "Self-determination" goals give Indians "the right to make choices; to decide ... as
individuals and as tribes, how to adapt to the modes of the general society without destroying
the values they cherish." FINAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 80.
163. One such act provided for the development of the human resources of the Indian peoples,
see Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-450n (1982),
while another act established a revolving Joan fund to aid reservation economic development.
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Because the canons of construction further the policy of Indian selfdetermination, they are today of greater utility than ever. Commentators have long recognized that the interpretative rule limiting treaty
abrogation is central to tribal preservation. 164 Of no less importance
are the canons of construction confirming and enforcing Indian rights
in ambiguous treaties and statutes. Issues that turn on the construction of treaties and statutes include ownership of minerals and oil-rich
lands, 165 right to preferential hiring, 166 and tax-exempt status. 161 In
resolving ambiguities in favor of Indian rights and interests, courts
can promote federal goals by protecting Indian rights and channeling
resources to Indians in disputed cases. 168
The Supreme Court's reluctance to use the canons of Indian treaty
and statutory construction has led to disarray in the lower courts. The
resulting abdication of the judiciary's traditional role in enforcing federal
trust duties has frustrated Indian self-sufficiency policies. For example, one lower court recently described the purpose of the canons as
an encouragement to the United States to draft clear treaties. 169 The
court declined to employ the canons because it reasoned that other
interests outweighed the supposed policy of "facilitating
communications." 110 In another case that same court applied the canons
of construction in interpreting a federal- Indian treaty. 111 The court
reconciled the two cases by explaining that the interests outweighing
See Indian Financing Act of 1974, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1543 (1982). Statutes allowing tribes to
enforce rights independently of the United States' actions on the Indians' behalf, and protecting
tribal members against arbitrary and capricious tribal government actions are further evidence
of congressional recognition of tribal sovereignty and governing powers. See 28 U.S.C. § 1362
(1982) (providing means by which tribes can pursue claims when the United States fails to act);
see also Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341 (1982). Tribes have criticized
the Civil Rights Act as burdensome, and destructive to traditional tribal government. See generally
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978); M. PRICE & R. CLINTON, supra note 9,
at 302; Israel, supra note 4, at 624-26; Comment, The Indian Bill of Rights and the Constitutional Status of Tribal Governments, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1343 (1969).
164. See Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 14.
165. See Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620 (1970).
166. Compare Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974) (upholding statutory Indian hiring
preference) with Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608 (1980) (eliminating BIA hiring
preference policy).
167. See McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973). See generally
Ramah Navajo School Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832 (1982); Central Mach.
Co. v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 448 U.S. 160 (1980); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker,
448 U.S. 136 (1980); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 447 U.S.
134 (1980); Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973). See generally Comment,
Indian Taxation: Underlying Policies and Present Problems, 59 CALIF. L. REv. 1261 (1971); Note,
State Taxation of Indians, 49 WASH. L. REV. I 97 (1973).
168. See generally Kennedy Hearings, supra note 24; Clinton, supra note 10; Israel, supra
note 4.
169. Wisconsin v. Baker, 698 F.2d 1323, 1334 n.12 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3537
(1983).
170. Id.
171. See Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Voigt, 700 F.2d
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the canons in the first decision were not present in the second. 1 72 Such
an approach neither safeguards Indian interests nor represents a coherent
expression of federal policy towards Indians.

B.

Codification or the Court? Revitalization of the Canons
Through Federal Legislation

The canons of construction could regain their important position
in the federal-Indian trust relationship either through a voluntary return
by the judiciary to the application of the canons, or by congressional
mandate.
I. Common Law Solution- The courts could themselves employ
the canons in all cases involving ambiguous treaty or statutory
language. 173 Because the canons were judicially formulated, this approach would require little more than strict adherence to precedent. 174
Canons of construction elaborated by the courts can, however, have
serious shortcomings. Judicial formulation and application of the canons
has not always been uniform. Tied by stare decisis to different definitions of the canons, courts interpret similar treaty language differently. 175
Furthermore, judicial rules of construction may be ignored or
distinguished in favor of conflicting rules of general interpretation or
contrary precedent. 116 Finally, the trend in recent Supreme Court decisions suggests that the judiciary is not willing at present to adhere to
the canons. In those cases where the Court has cited the interpretive
principles their application has been disingenuous.
2. Codification of the Canons into Statute- Congressional action
enacting the canons of construction is feasible and can avoid the
weaknesses in judicial canon implementation. A task force of the
congressionally-appointed American Indian Policy Review Commission
341 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 53 (1983).
172. Wisconsin v. Baker, 698 F.2d 1323, 1334 n.12 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3537
(1983).
173. See generally Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 14, at 645 (advocating a judicial rule
for use in treaty abrogation cases).
174. See generally R. BARSH & J. HENDERSON, supra note 12, at xi; V. DELORIA, JR. & C.
LYTLE, supra note 12 at 48.
175. See TASK FORCE NINE, supra note 14, at 62. Compare Wisconsin v. Baker, 698 F.2d
1323, 1334 n.12 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3537 (1983) (stating that the p_urpose of
the canons is to encourage the United States "to express itself more plainly when it drafts a
treaty [with Indians, thus ensuring the agreements are] voluntary in the sense that the Indians
understood them") with Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County, 532 F.2d 655, 660 (9th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977) (indicating that "[t]his principle is somewhat more
than a canon of construction akin to a Latin maxim, easily invoked and as easily disregarded.
It is an interpretive device, early framed by John Marshall's legal conscience for ensuring the
discharge of the nation's obligations to the conquered Indian tribes"). See generally R. BARSH
& J. HENDERSON;supra note 12, at vii-xv; V. DELORIA, JR. AND C. LYTLE, supra note 12, at 50.
176. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981); Mitchell I, 445 U.S. 535 (1980);
see generally V. DELORIA, JR. & C. LYTLE, supra note 12, at 50.
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(AIPRC) proposed federal legislation in 1976. 177 The statutory canons
drafted by the AIPRC task force, however, failed to include the reserved
rights doctrine, and did not adequately separate the canons applicable
to unilateral federal acts from those applying to treaties and
agreements. 118 The work of the AIPRC has been largely forgotten. Congress took no substantive action on the AIPRC's 206
recommendations, 119 and did not enact legislation codifying the canons
of construction.
The 1976 AIPRC Task Force idea was sound and the need for federal
legislation has grown more urgent in light of recent Supreme Court
decisions withdrawing from use of the canons. 180 A congressional directive to courts to apply the canons would reaffirm the importance of
the canons as a component of the federal trust obligation. The plenary
power of Congress in Indian affairs 181 ensures deference by both the
Supreme Court and lower courts to a legislative expression of support
for the canons of construction. 182 Codification of the canons would
offer Indians an opportunity to participate in the drafting of the
canons, 183 and influence the development of the rules designed for their
benefit.
Codification of the canons could also increase tribal access to federal
courts. Although the United States' Attorney's office files suits on behalf
of Indian tribes, tribes may bring suit themselves where the United
States refuses to do so. 184 Clearly stated legislative presumptions in
favor of Indian rights would ease the often prohibitive financial burdens
of litigation. 185 The canons require courts to both presume Congress
177. See TASK FORCE NINE, supra note 14, at 61-73. The Commission was given only two
years to complete its study but compiled much information within that time. Criticism over the
choice of Commission members, see V. DELORIA, JR. & C. LYTLE, supra note 12, at 23, and
internal dissension, see FINAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 567-612 (dissenting views of Rep. Lloyd
Meeds), reflected the ongoing conflict between assimilation and autonomy theorists. See also
Clinton, supra note 10, at 979-80 n.2; Israel, supra note 4, at 627-28.
178. See TASK FORCE NINE, supra note 14, at 73.
179. V. DELORIA, JR. & C. LYTLE, supra note 12, at 24.
180. See supra Part II.
181. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
182. No court has ever held federal legislation concerning Indians to be outside the scope
of congressional power. See generally United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634 (1978); United States
v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886); Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 14, at 615 n.66.
183. Indian participation could lessen the effects of strong anti-Indian lobbies. See generally
M. PRICE & R. CLINTON, supra note 9, at 90. Indians are American citizens, with full voting
rights. 8 U.S.C. § !40l(b) (1982). Despite financial and numerical handicaps, certain Indian lobbying efforts have achieved considerable success. See Act of Dec. 15, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-550,
84 Stat. 1437 (restoring the Sacred Blue Lake to the Taos Pueblos of New Mexico); see also
R. BARSH & J. HENDERSON, supra note 12, at 218-20, 251-52; V. DELORIA, JR., supra note 10,
at 7-11; Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 14 at 660 n.339.
184. See 28 U.S.C. § 1362 (1982).
185. Indian incomes are below the national average and more Indians are below the poverty
level than non-Indians. FINAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 91. In 1969, 40-50% of Indians 16
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intended to act for the benefit of Indians and to construe ambiguous
language in favor of Indian interests. Indians could thus more easily
establish a cause of action and meet their evidentiary burdens without
presenting voluminous proof of congressional intent. 186
A set of well-defined statutory canons would ensure uniformity in
application of the canons. This consistency would provide greater certainty in the interpretation of treaties and statutes and make comparisons
between different treaties more relevant. 187
Finally, codification of the canons would not require Congress to
create an elaborate new doctrine, or depart from current policies.
Because the canons have been in use for 150 years, there is much
material from which to draft a statute. 188
C.

The Elements of A Model Statute

Legislative canons of construction should require the use of the canons
in any issue involving the interpretation of ambiguous language in Indian treaties, statutes, agreements, and executive orders. 189 Federal enactment of the interpretive principles should adhere to basic principles
of federal-Indian law. Definitions for terms such as "Indian" and "Indian tribe" should be taken from existing legislation to avoid judicial
years or older were unemployed, in comparison to a 4% non-Indian unemployment average.
Sonnenberg, The Role of the Federal Government in Present-Day Indian Industrial and Commercial Development: A Discussion in SUBCOMM. ON ECONOMICS IN GOVERNMENT OF THE JOINT
ECONOMIC COMM., 91ST CONG., 1ST SEss., TOWARD ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FOR NATNE AMERICAN
COMMUNITIES 310 (Comm. Print 1969); see generally National Congress of American Indians,
Economic Development of the American Indian and His Lands, in SuBCOMM. ON ECONOMICS
IN GOVERNMENT OF THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, 91ST CONG., 1ST SESS., supra, at 410, 411-12.
186. The analogous Michigan Environmental Protection Act of 1970 (MEPA) effected a similar
reduction of evidentiary burdens. MICH. COMP. LAWS§§ 691.1201-1207 (1979). The statute lessens
the requirement for a prima facie case. See MICH. COMP. LAWS§§ 691.1203 (1979). This avoids
protracted discovery and makes litigation available to individual citizens. See also Federal Coal
Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-941, 951, 958
(1982); Federal Longshoremans' and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950
(1982). See generally Haynes, Michigan's Environmental Protection Act in its Sixth Year: Substantive Environmental Law From Citizen Suits 53 J. URB. L. 589 (I 976); Trauberman, Compensating Victims of Toxic Substances Pollution: An Analysis of Existing Federal Statutes, 5 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. I, 11-14, 23-25 (1981).
187. Two problems appear unavoidable. First, the definition of an ambiguity that triggers
use of the codified canons is itself uncertain. See generally R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION
AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 43-48 (1975) (discussing ambiguities inherent in language). Thus,
courts may circumvent the codified canons by determining that the questioned language is unambiguous. But see id. at 105 (finding ambiguities highly probable in cross-cultural communication).
Second, courts may develop precedent that narrowly limits situations to which the canons can
be applied. See generally, R. BARSH & J. HENDERSON, supra note 12, at x-xii (discussing precedent as limiting courts). This could defeat the purpose of the canons, by requiring Indians to
prove that the canons should be invoked. Congress could enact legislation to change such a
practice, but a congressional check may work better in theory than in fact.
188. E.g. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
189. See TASK FORCE NINE, supra note 14, at 62-3.
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uncertainty as to which peoples may invoke the statutory
presumptions. 190 The organization of the statute should separate the
canons of construction applicable to bilateral treaties and agreements
from those applicable to unilateral federal acts. A division between
the differing types of government action affecting Indians would clarify
which canons apply to each and emphasize the equal importance of
the canons in construing unilateral federal acts. 191
The section enumerating the canons of construction applicable to
federal-Indian treaties and agreements should incorporate the reserved
rights doctrine, requiring treaties and agreements to be read as reserving to Indians all rights that were not expressly granted away. 192 The
reserved rights principle expands Indian rights beyond the language
of a treaty by reading its provisions in light of tribal sovereignty and
exclusive land occupancy rights. 193 The doctrine is the guiding principle for all the canons of construction: in the absence of clear granting
language the right in question remains in the tribe. 194 To clarify its
importance, the reserved rights doctrine should be enumerated first.
The canons of construction developed by the courts 195 should follow
the reserved rights doctrine. These rules could be formulated as
refinements and applications of the reserved rights doctrine or as
separate provisions. Either arrangement must express three policies:
(1) federal-Indian treaties and agreements must be construed as the
participating tribes understood them; 196 (2) treaties and agreements must
190. Definitions such as those in the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance
Act, 25 U.S.C. § 450b(a), (b) (1982) are best, because they are political rather than racial. Such
definitions, however, exclude Indians not members of tribes federally "recognized." 25 U.S.C.
§ 450b(a), (b) (1982).
Adding an alternative eligibility standard based on some quantum of Indian blood may be
necessary to ensure inclusion of Indians from tribes whose federal recognition was terminated
in the 1950's or from tribes that have never been federally recognized. See generally FINAL REPORT,
supra note 12, at 107-09 (defining Indians), 447-56 (describing present conditions of terminated
tribes).
191. Some commentators have criticized application of the canons to unilateral acts. See generally Decker, supra note 66. A separate provision devoted to the unilateral canons would eliminate
doubt as to their validity. See infra note 200.
192. See United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905). Although the reserved rights
doctrine is not often categorized as a canon of construction, it should be. Compare F. COHEN,
supra note I, at 222 (not describing the reserved rights doctrine as a canon of construction)
with V. DELORIA, JR. & C. LYTLE, supra note 12, at 48 (including reserved rights doctrine as
a canon of construction). See infra notes 200-01 and accompanying text.
193. See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 598-601 (1963) (protecting reserved rights to
water); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908) (recognizing reserved rights to water);
United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905) (protecting reserved rights of fishing); V. DELORIA,
JR. & C. LYTLE, supra note 12, at 49. See also Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832)
(recognizing inherent sovereignty of Indian tribes).
194. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
195. See infra notes 196-98.
196. E.g., Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620,631 (1970); United States v. Shoshone
Tribe of Indians, 304 U.S. Ill, 116 (1938); Starr v. Long Jim, 227 U.S. 613, 622-23 (1913);
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be read liberally to benefit the Indian parties; 197 and (3) ambiguities
in treaties and agreements must be interpreted in favor of the Indian
claimants. 198 The statute should expressly state that extrinsic evidence
including historical circumstances and documents relating to the negotiations is relevant to determining the intent of the parties to a treaty
or agreement unless Congress has clearly expressed otherwise on the
face of the documents. 199
The section of the statute enumerating the canons applicable to
unilateral federal acts should ensure that statutes and executive orders
are read to benefit Indian rights and interests. 200 The legislation should
expressly apply the canons of construction to statutes of general applicability that infringe on Indian interests. 201 The Act should also clarify
that the construction favoring Indian interests can be overcome only
by evidence of clearly expressed contrary congressional intent. 202 The
judicial canons of construction applicable to unilateral federal acts
should be lisited separately: (1) statutes and executive orders must be
liberally construed to the benefit of the affected Indians or tribes; 203
United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380-81 (1905); Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. I, II (1899);
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 551-54, 582 (1832).
197. E.g., Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194,200 (1975); Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199,
236 (1974); Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1943); Seminole
Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296 (1942); Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 684-85
(1942); Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665,675 (1912); United States v. Walker River Irrig. Dist.,
104 F.2d 334, 337 (9th Cir. 1939).
198. E.g., McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973); Carpenter
v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1908).
199. See TASK FoRCE NINE, supra note 14, at 73. Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S.
620 (1970) provides a good example of this principle.
200. A major criticism of the canons as applied to statutes is that unilaterally enacted legislation does not involve questions of Indian understanding and unfair bargaining positions. See
Decker, supra note 66. The canons serve, however, to further the federal trust responsibility,
independent of their function as bargaining position equalizers. See generally Chambers, supra
note I, at 1214.
A second objection to application of the canons to statutes is that Indians are represented
in Congress. But see Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 14, at 660 n.339 (arguing that because
of their small numbers and budgets, Indians cannot overcome powerful opposing lobbies). This
argument does not lessen the government's obligation under the federal-Indian trust to act in
the best interests of the Indians. The canons of construction, ensuring that ambiguities will not
be resolved against the Indians, serve to enforce that obligation.
201. Because Congress may unknowingly pass a statute which in practice has a negative impact on an Indian right or interest, a presumption that Congress did not intend to impair such
interests is necessary. See United States v. White, 508 F.2d 453 (8th Cir. 1974); Brecher, supra
note 70. Under such a presumption, Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608 (1980), might
have been decided differently. See supra notes I 13-28 and accompanying text.
202. A "clear expression" standard is similar to the standard advocated by Wilkinson &
Volkman, supra note 14, at 645, for determining congressional intent to abrogate an Indian treaty.
Such a standard ensures that Congress has considered carefully legislation affecting Indian interests.
203. E.g. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 392 (1976); Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S.
I, 6-7 (1956); Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 675 (1912).
The statute should expressly include both tribes and Indian individuals because some statutes
are tailored to benefit individual Indians. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. §§ 44-47 (1982) (hiring preference
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and (2) ambiguities in such acts must be resolved in favor of the affected Indians or tribes. 204
A third section should direct the courts to consider federal trust obligations and the federal policy of Indian self-determination when interpreting Indian treaties and statutes. 205 Such a rule would reaffirm the
viability of the federal-Indian trust in the era of self-determination 206
and clarify congressional approval of the preservation of tribal autonomy
through economic development using treaty guaranteed resources. 201
A final rule should require the courts to place burdens of persuasion
and proof on the non-Indian party to show clearly expressed congressional intent to impair Indian rights or property. 208 This provision would
clarify that Indian claimants cannot be required to prove that their
fiduciary trustee did not intend to breach its duty. The canons are a
presumption that the trustee intended to act in the beneficiaries' best
interest; 209 the opposing party must rebut this presumption.

D.

A Model Statute

The following statute is one model of codified canons of Indian treaty
and statutory construction. 210
(a) For the purposes of this Act, the term(1) "Indian" means a person who is a member of an
Indian tribe; 211
(2) "Indian tribe" means any Indian tribe, band, nation,
statutes); see also TASK FORCE NINE, supra note 14, at 106-24.
204. E.g. Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 411-13 (1968); Alaska
Pacific Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 87 (1918); see TASK FORCE NINE, supra note
14, at 73. See supra notes 65-73 and accompanying text.
205. See generally 25 U.S.C. § 450(a) (1982); S. REP. No. 561, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971);
TASK FORCE NINE, supra note 14, at 28-30.
This principle would probably require a different result in decisions such as Montana v. United
States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
206. Codified canons would show a firm commitment by Congress to Indian autonomy, ana
reassure Indians that self-determination policies will not lead to termination of the trust itself.
See generally Israel, supra note 4, at 628 n.40.
207. See generally FINAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 305-65; Ickes, supra note 161.
208. Congress has enacted a statute placing the burden of proof on "white person[s]" in
litigation between Indians and whites over property rights. 25 U.S.C. § 194 (1982). This statute
"clearly evidences a protectionist policy with regard to Indians." Omaha Indian Tribe v. Wilson,
575 F.2d 620, 632 (8th Cir. 1978), vacated on other grounds, 442 U.S. 653 (1979); see 34 Op.
Att'y Gen. 439, 444 (1925) (recognizing the federal government's continuing policy of construing
treaties and statutes to the Indians' benefit). A similar protectionist policy should require the
party contesting an Indian interest to show that the federal trustee acted to impair the beneficiaries'
rights.
209. See Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County, 532 F.2d 655, 660 (9th Cir. 1975);
F. COHEN, supra note I, at 221- 25; M. PRICE & R. CLINTON, supra note 9, at 137; Barsh &
Henderson, supra note 5, at 654.
210. See TASK FORCE NINE, supra note 14, at 73; supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
211. See Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. § 450b(a) (1982).
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or other organized group or community, including
any Alaska Native village or regional or village corporation as defined in or established pursuant to the
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act [Title 43 United
States Code Sections 1601-1616] which is recognized
as eligible for the special programs and services provided by the United States to Indians because of their
status as lndians; 212 and,
(3) "Federal fiduciary obligation" means a federal
equitable trust relationship in which the federal
government is trustee and any Indian or Indian tribe
is the beneficiary. 213
(b) All federal treaties, statutorily ratified agreements, statutes,
and executive orders reserving, granting, or affecting rights
to or of any Indian or Indian tribe shall be subject to the
following principles:
(1) Any treaty or statutorily ratified agreement between
the federal government and any Indian or Indian tribe:
(A) shall be read as a grant from the Indian or Indian tribe to the federal government;
(B) shall be read as reserving to the Indian or Indian tribe any right not expressly granted;
(C) shall be read as the Indian or Indian tribe participating in the relevant treaty or agreement
negotiations would have understood the
document;
(i) For purposes of this subsection Indian
understanding shall be determined from the
relevant treaty and agreement negotiations,
and the historical context of and circumstances surrounding such negotiations;
(D) shall be read liberally in favor of the Indian
or Indian tribe; and,
(E) shall be read to resolve any ambiguity within
the document in favor of the Indian or Indian
tribe.
(2) Any statute or executive order affecting any right or
interest of any Indian or Indian tribe:
(A) shall be construed narrowly where such federal
act harms such right or interest;
212. See 25 U.S.C. § 450b(b) (1982).
213. See United States v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391, 398 (1978); St. Paul lntertribal Hous.
Bd. v. Reynolds, 564 F. Supp. 1408, 1411 (D. Minn. 1983); Eric v. Secretary of Hous. & Urban
Dev., 464 F. Supp. 44, 46 (0. Alaska 1978).
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(B)

(3)

(4)

shall be construed broadly where such federal
act benefits such right or interest;
(C) shall be construed to avoid impairment of any
such right or interest where the federal act is
intended to have general applicability;
(D) shall be construed liberally in favor of the affected Indian or Indian tribe; and,
(E) shall be construed to resolve any ambiguity
within the federal act in favor of the affected
Indian or Indian tribe.
Burdens of proof and persuasion shall be on the party contesting a right or interest claimed by an Indian
or Indian tribe to show clearly expressed congressional
intent to act contrary to such right or interest.
All such treaties, statutorily ratified agreements,
statutes, and executive orders shall be construed to
further:
(A) fulfillment of the federal fiduciary obligation
to any Indian or Indian tribe; and,
(B) federal policy to promote Indian selfgovernment and Indian economic development.
CONCLUSION

Recent Supreme Court decisions interpreting Indian treaties or statutes
affecting Indians have retreated from meaningful application of the
canons of construction developed over the past 150 years. Courts created
the canons to enforce trust obligations of the federal government and
protect Indian rights.
.
The canons can further the contemporary federal policy of Indian
autonomy. Courts apply the canons inconsistently; Congress should
enact legislation requiring judicial use of the canons to resolve ambiguities in. federal acts affecting Indians.
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